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Abstract:  This paper replicates Gruber, Kim, and Mayzlin’s (1999) analysis of the effect of
physician financial incentives on cesarean delivery rates, using their data, sample
selection criteria, and specification.  Coincident trends explain much of their
estimated positive relation between fees and cesarean utilization, which also falls
somewhat upon the inclusion of several childbirth observations that had been
inadvertently excluded from their estimation sample.  The data ultimately indicate
that a $1000 increase, in current dollars, in the reimbursement for a cesarean section
increases cesarean delivery rates by about one percentage point, one-quarter of the
effect estimated originally.
JEL Codes: I11; I18
Keywords: cesarean section; financial incentives; HCUPThe cesarean section is one of the most common surgical procedures, and one of those most
studied by economists, for good reasons: it absorbs billions of dollars of health care resources
annually, is used with widely varying frequency across regions and across providers, and is
potentially responsive to a variety of economic forces, including source of payment, malpractice
liability, and financial incentives.
 Yet there are few studies of the last of these, financial incentives.  One of the most recent
and most expansive, by Gruber, Kim, and Mayzlin (1999, hereafter GKM), relates cesarean use to
the fee premium paid to physicians by Medicaid when a cesarean delivery is performed instead of
a vaginal delivery.  In a panel analysis of publicly available childbirth microdata covering nine states
for the years 1988-1992, GKM conclude that $434 additional reimbursement (in 1989 dollars),
which was the difference in the cesarean fee premium between Medicaid and private insurance in
1989, increases the probability of cesarean delivery by 3.04 to 5.51 percentage points, which was
most of the 5.7 percentage point private-Medicaid cesarean differential in 1989.  Thus the widely-
documented difference in cesarean rates between public and private payers is primarily accounted
for by financial incentives.  While a few other studies, mentioned below, conclude otherwise, none
has received the attention of this one, which has 31 citations, in published and unpublished
manuscripts, in Google Scholar as of June 2008.
The accessible data, simple design, and striking conclusions of this study make it a suitable
candidate for replication.  Accordingly, we obtained the same data used by GKM originally and
attempted to reproduce their results, generously assisted by the original authors, who shared their
data assembly programs with us.  In addition, as standard empirical practice in panel studies of this
type has evolved somewhat since the original study was published, we also explored the effect of
some of these changes on the findings–particularly the inclusion of state trends, which are clearly2
(1)
observable in the data, in the regression specification.  These trends and, to a lesser degree, data
assembly issues, are both important.  We ultimately conclude that financial incentives may influence
cesarean utilization in these data, but, if so, the effect is much smaller than originally advertised.
1.  Description of the original study
Since 1988, the Nationwide Inpatient Sample of the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project
(HCUP) has recorded clinical and nonclinical information on roughly one-fifth of all inpatient stays
in community hospitals, about one thousand hospitals in various states nationwide in each year.
GKM analyzed the 1988-1992 HCUP data for nine states: California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois,
Iowa, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wisconsin.  Arizona and Massachusetts, also
represented in these data, were omitted because the former had an unusual Medicaid program and
the latter had “inconsistent” data on physician fees.  This left 42 state*year cells (certain years are
missing in two states) containing 365,942 Medicaid-financed deliveries used for analysis.
This analysis related the probability of a cesarean delivery to the Medicaid physician cesarean
fee premium (cesarean fee - vaginal fee) in that state in that year, FEEDIFF; state and year fixed
effects, : and J; and controls for maternal demographics, hospital characteristics, and clinical
indicators for cesarean section, X.  Estimated using a logit model, the specification is as follows:
where i, s, and t index individuals, states, and time; C is a dummy that equals one if individual i’s
delivery was performed by cesarean section and zero otherwise; 7 is the logistic distribution3
function; and $ and ( are regression coefficients.  We are mostly interested in the value of (.
The effect of fee changes was predicted using the marginal effect of a one unit change in
FEEDIFF at the mean of the independent variables.  The model was estimated with a single clinical
control (for a prior cesarean section) and with an expanded set of four clinical controls (adding
dummies for breech presentation, fetal distress, and maternal distress).  These two models were also
estimated with an alternative FEEDIFF measure, the fee premium divided by the average private
reimbursement for a vaginal delivery in that state in that year.  The results were reasonably similar
across all four estimations: as noted above, the predicted effect of a $434 increase in the fee
differential ranged from 3.04 to 5.51 percentage points. 
2.  Replication
We obtained the identical data from the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality,
attempted to recreate the estimation sample using GKM’s simple selection criteria (all Medicaid-
financed deliveries in the above-listed states), and recreated the original variables.  These were taken
verbatim from the data except for the clinical indicators, created from standard ICD-9 diagnosis
codes, and the cesarean indicator, determined from the Diagnostic Related Group (DRG) code.  The
FEEDIFF variable, merged in at the state*year level, is provided by GKM in the original study.
We first encounter difficulty reproducing the sample, whose size differs by a factor of three:
947,664 observations to 365,942 observations.  This difference accrues partly to the method used
to identify the childbirth cases in the HCUP data.  We use DRG codes, which are universally
reported here.  GKM, in contrast, used supplemental ICD-9 diagnosis codes (V270-V277) that are4
not reported as frequently, as documented in Table 1, which shows the total number of observations
accruing under different selection criteria.  When weighted by the discharge weight to the universe
of U.S. community hospital discharges, the full set of DRG-selected childbirth observations maps
closely to total births in the U.S. Vital Statistics, as it should (the small difference reflects out-of-
hospital deliveries and multiple births).  Unweighted, GKM’s ICD-selected sample size is
consistently two-thirds of ours, and double that reported in the original (which we cannot account
for).  Accordingly, we proceed with the larger, DRG-selected sample.
Variable means, presented in Table 2, suggest the two samples are different, but not markedly
so.  GKM’s means include the states of Arizona and Massachusetts, which are excluded from their
empirical analysis, so we present means that include, and exclude, these two states.  Both ways the
cesarean rate is two percentage points higher in the DRG-selected sample, while mothers are slightly
older and somewhat wealthier; teaching hospitals are more frequent, and public hospitals less
frequent.  There is no strong geographic or racial difference across all three samples.  Note also that
all samples are dominated by just two states, California and Florida, which account for over 60% of
the observations used in our regressions.  Estimation results, therefore, may be sensitive to the
weighting these states receive, or, equivalently, the assumed error structure.
Next we re-estimate GKM’s two specifications with the original FEEDIFF measure: Model
(1) includes only a prior cesarean dummy as a clinical control, while Model (3) adds dummies for
breech birth, fetal distress, and maternal distress.  This last variable, not precisely defined, was
intended to reflect “complications...arising from either conditions existing prior to pregnancy (i.e.,
diabetes, hypertension, or infectious diseases) or pathological conditions which develop during
pregnancy (i.e., eclampsia or placenta previa)” (pp. 487-488).  While these complications are not5
uncommon, in GKM’s means this dummy is one only 0.01% of the time.  Their programs show that
this dummy was set to one only for maternal distress “not elsewhere classified” (ICD-9 code 669.0),
excluding common sources of maternal distress, which have their own identifiers.  Accordingly, we
run two Model (3) regressions: one that omits the maternal distress dummy, which should be
virtually identical to GKM’s Model (3) given the rarity of their maternal distress indicator, and one
that includes a more robust indicator based on GKM’s description above, including diabetes,
hypertension, pre-eclampsia, placenta previa, herpes, and maternal distress not elsewhere classified.
The results are in Table 3.  Coefficients on the controls rarely differ in sign from those in the
original, but frequently differ in magnitude.  The standard errors also differ, partly because of the
increased sample size and partly because GKM’s standard errors are adjusted for state*year
clustering, which we will discuss shortly.  The coefficient estimates on FEEDIFF are 20% to 30%
lower than in the original.  These coefficients imply that a $434 fee increase raises cesarean rates by
2-2.5 percentage points.
For this calculation we use the average marginal effect, the theoretically appropriate measure,
increasingly recognized as preferable to the marginal effect evaluated at the mean of the independent
variables, the measure used by GKM (Fernandez-Val, 2007).  The two differ substantially here, as
Table 2 shows, because cesarean probabilities are largely bifurcated across mothers: they are high
for mothers with clinical indications for a cesarean, and low for those without such indications.
Either way, the marginal effect of a fee increase is modest, as is, then, the average of these marginal
effects.  In contrast, the average of the independent variables falls closer to the middle of the logit
distribution, where the marginal effects are relatively large.  Consequently, our implied coefficient
effects are 40% smaller than in the original, despite a smaller divergence in the coefficient estimates.6
(2)
3.  Estimation and specification
To explore estimation issues, it is instructive to first illustrate the association between fees
and cesarean probabilities at the state level, where the “natural experiments” driving this study are
conducted.  Figure 1 presents three variables for all state*year cells in our estimation sample:
FEEDIFF, the unadjusted cesarean rate, and a proxy for the cesarean rate that is adjusted for hospital
characteristics, maternal demographics, and prior cesarean section, as in Model (1).  This proxy is
created by regressing the probability of cesarean delivery on these factors and 42 dummies
s,t representing all state*year cells, m , as follows:
The coefficients m, which are not directly interpretable but are virtually proportional to adjusted
cesarean rates, are graphed in Figure 1.  For the most part, adjusted rates closely track unadjusted
rates, because the independent variables change little within states over time.  Deviations can be
traced back to changes in the means of the prior cesarean dummy and total hospital discharges.
Examination of FEEDIFF within states across years reveals virtually no change in four states,
modest changes (< $150) in three, and large changes (> $150) in two: California and Colorado.
These changes are typically monotonic.  Similarly, there is little trend in adjusted or unadjusted
cesarean rates in some states, and a steady downward trend in others.  These trends sometimes
coincide with fee changes, raising the spectre of bias.
This is true for California in particular, which combines a dramatic reduction in fees with the
largest reduction in adjusted cesarean rates observed in the sample.  This is the only positive7
association between fees and cesarean use in any state, and it alone accounts for the econometric
estimates reported previously.  When the sample excludes California, estimates of the FEEDIFF
coefficient, in Table 4, are negative.  The inferences drawn from these data depend crucially on
whether one accounts for state-specific trends and whether one treats California as an outlier.
Further examination indicates we should do the former but not the latter.  The years 1988-
1992 represented a turning point in U.S. cesarean rates: the first decline after two decades of increase
(Clarke and Taffel, 1995).  California led this trend, both in alacrity and vigor: the cesarean rate
crested there sooner, in early 1987, and (adjusted for risk) dropped faster, as Figure 1 shows.
Stafford, Sullivan, and Gardner (1993, p. 1301) suggest three possible reasons for this: 1) “the well-
publicized publication of several articles critical of high cesarean section rates,” 2) “increasing public
awareness of cesarean section practices,” and 3) “changing reimbursement policies of insurers,
especially the state Medicaid program,” Medi-Cal, which aggressively lowered the cesarean fee
premium (in stages) from $563 in October 1986 (AGI, 1987) to $0 in November 1989 (ACOG,
1991).  Accordingly, cesarean rates fell for all payers after 1987, with Medi-Cal leading the way: a
drop of 3.5 percentage points through 1990, at least twice that of other payers Kaiser, selfpay, and
private insurance (Stafford, Sullivan, and Gardner, 1993).  Our data show that adjusted cesarean rates
continued to drop through 1992.
In summary, reduced reimbursement was an important strategy used to cut cesarean
utilization in California in the late 1980s, but was probably not the sole relevant factor; the decline
in cesarean rates is roughly, but not closely, coincident with the decline in the fee differential.  Under
these circumstances it seems most reasonable to include California in the sample and, following
recent practice, to include state-specific trends in the specification.  These regressions, in the fourth8
(3)
row of Table 4, obtain coefficient estimates on FEEDIFF that are about half those obtained in the
trendless estimates (significant in Model 1, not in Model 3).
  An alternative, more technical approach arrives at the same conclusion.  In the regressions
above observations are “clustered” by state*year cells if there are unobserved, time-varying, state-
specific factors that also influence the cesarean rate–that is, state*year random effects.  Then
ordinary least squares produces biased standard errors and inefficient coefficient estimates.  The bias
and the inefficiency can each be large when a few states dominate the data and when there are
serially correlated errors, conditions that are met here.  GKM’s standard errors are corrected for
clustering; we also correct the coefficient estimates, using a generalized least squares regression of
the m coefficients in equation (2) on FEEDIFF and the fixed effects:
1
s,t where , is the random effect, which may be serially correlated, and <  is the sampling error in
s,t estimating m .  The results, in Table 4, are similar to those in the regressions with state trends,
accompanied by larger standard errors that sometimes render the coefficient estimate insignificant.
Across the bottom nine regressions in Table 4, which account for state*year clustering, serial
dependence, or both, the coefficient estimates center around 0.02.  This is about one-third the size
of the 0.05-0.07 estimates reported by GKM.  Average marginal effects calculated from these
estimates imply that a $100 increase in fees, in contemporaneous dollars, raises cesarean rates by a
little more than one-quarter of a percentage point, or that the $434 nationwide difference in cesarean
reimbursement rates between Medicaid and private insurance in 1989 raised cesarean rates by
roughly one percentage point.  This is one-fourth the size of GKM’s original marginal effects9
evaluated at the mean of the independent variables (and is less precisely estimated).
GKM also present estimations (Model 2 and Model 4) with an alternative measure of
financial incentives, the Medicaid cesarean fee premium normalized by the private charge for vaginal
delivery.  We have re-estimated the first four specifications in Table 3 with this alternative measure.
As with the original fee measure, our coefficients are somewhat smaller than in GKM; as in GKM,
these estimates imply somewhat larger effects than the original fee measure does.  We do not present
these estimates, however, because we are unable to reproduce GKM’s alternative fee measure where
we have the necessary data,  and lack the data to recreate it entirely.
2
4.  Conclusion
In summary, we find financial incentives have, at best, a small effect on delivery methods
at the margin.  In current dollars, a $1000 increase in the reimbursement for performing a cesarean
section would increase cesarean delivery rates by little more than one percentage point.  This finding
jibes with that of the closest related study, by Keeler and Fok (1996), of a cesarean/vaginal fee
equalization at one insurer.  It contrasts with that of Currie and Gruber (2001), who find even larger
effects than GKM using a fully national dataset but a less direct research design.
Our findings imply that financial incentives are not an effective mechanism with which to
influence physicians’ choice of delivery method.  This is consistent with numerous contemporaneous
anecdotal reports of unsuccessful attempts by Blue Cross units to lower cesarean rates through
reduced financial incentives (Stafford, 1990; Darby, 1992; Ricci et al. 1993).
Our findings also imply that other factors account for the large private payer/public payer gap10
in U.S. cesarean rates.  Analyzing a nationwide sample of births in 1988 and all Florida hospital
births in 1992, Grant (2005) finds that clinical risk factors and matching between privately insured
mothers and physicians who are predisposed to perform cesareans explains all but one percentage
point of this gap.  This remaining difference corresponds to the contribution of financial incentives
estimated here.
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Table 1.  Sample Sizes and Weights in the HCUP Data.











Total Births 1988-1992, U.S.
Vital Statistics
----- ----- ----- 20,284,061
All Birthing Cases in 1988-
1992 HCUP
2,292,373 3,434,491 19,283,280 -----
Above with Primary Payer =
Medicaid
  731,883 1,028,828  5,797,859  -----
Above with AZ and MA
Removed 
  689,175   947,746 5,396,710 -----
Above with Missing Age Data
Removed




----- ----- -----   365,942
Note: Missing age data appears to be included in the omitted age category in GKM’s regressions.12
Table 2.  Variable Means.
Variable Original Replication: All Replication:
Estimation Sample
Number of Observations  365,942 ** 1,028,735 947,664
Cesarean Delivery Rate 0.178 0.197 0.197
Clinical Factors:
 Previous Cesarean 0.093 0.100 0.100
 Fetal Distress 0.094 0.103 0.101
 Breech Presentation 0.029 0.031 0.031
 Maternal Distress  0.0001 0.065 *** 0.065 ***
Median Income:
 < $15,000 0.053 0.053 0.055
 $15,000-$20,000 0.173 0.156 0.158
 $20,000-$25,000 0.257 0.247 0.246
 $25,000-$30,000 0.207 0.212 0.212
 $30,000-$35,000 0.118 0.132 0.130
 $35,000-$40,000 0.065 0.072 0.070
 $40,000-$45,000 0.026 0.034 0.033
 > $45,000 0.021 0.025 0.026
 Income Missing 0.080 0.069 0.071
Age: 
 < 20 0.246 0.248 0.248
 20-25 0.371 0.339 0.338
 25-30 0.222 0.197 0.197
 30-35 0.111 0.093 0.094
 35-40 not listed 0.031 0.031
 40-45 not listed 0.005 0.005
 > 45 not listed 0.000 0.00013
Race:
 White 0.201 0.203 0.193
 Black 0.085 0.088 0.088
 Other 0.252 0.229 0.236
Hospital Characteristics:
 Teaching 0.343 0.419 0.413
 Private for Profit 0.053 0.049 0.052
 Public 0.327 0.295 0.311
 Number of 
 Discharges (1000s)
22.250 21.547  21.751 
State:
 Arizona 0.021 0.033 ----
 California 0.331 0.296 0.321
 Colorado 0.022 0.019 0.020
 Florida 0.283 0.269 0.293
 Iowa 0.051 0.040 0.043
 Illinois 0.099 0.112 0.121
 Massachusetts 0.037 0.046 ----
 New Jersey 0.025 0.052 0.056
 Pennsylvania 0.044 0.046 0.050
 Washington 0.027 0.031 0.033
 Wisconsin 0.059 0.057 0.062
** The number of observations listed for the original study refers to the estimation sample.  The
means presented in that study include data from the states Arizona and Massachusetts, which were
omitted for estimation.  Including those states, the original study means would come from
approximately 388,500 observations (365,942)/(1-0.021-0.037).  The number of observations in the
“Replication: All” column has missing age data removed, and so is slightly smaller than that in the
corresponding cell of Table 1.
*** A broader definition of maternal distress is used in the replication, as discussed in the text.14
Table 3. Logit Model Estimates (coefficient estimates, with standard errors in parentheses).



























































































































































































































































































   yes    yes    yes    yes    yes
Interpreting the
Fee Coefficient:
  Marginal Effect at
  the Mean * 4.34
 (percentage points)
 3.13 **   2.44  4.14 **   3.64   3.93
  Average Marginal
  Effect * 4.34
 (percentage points)
  ----   1.95   ----   2.49   2.62
Note: The dependent variable is a binary indicator for cesarean delivery.  N=365,942 in the original
study and 947,664 in the replication.  Standard errors in the original are adjusted for state*year
clustering. ** The entries for the marginal effect at the mean in the original study are this author’s
calculations using the findings presented in the original.  The original authors’ calculations differ
slightly.  *** Discharges in the replication, but not the original, are measured in thousands.16
Table 4.  Alternative Estimates of the Fee Effect (coefficient estimates, with standard errors in
parentheses and average marginal effects in brackets, when applicable).




























































Note: The dependent variable is literally (in the first four rows) or effectively (in the last two
rows–see the discussion in the text) a binary indicator for cesarean delivery.  Fees are measured in
hundreds of dollars, and average marginal effects are multiplied by one hundred for ease of
interpretation.  Thus, the average marginal effect gives the expected effect on cesarean rates, in
percentage points, of a $100 increase in fees (in contemporaneous dollars).  Year dummies are also
included in the state trends specification; the coefficient estimates are slightly larger if these are
removed.  N= 947,664 in the full micro sample; N = 643,182 in the omit California subsample; there
are 42 state*year cells in the two-step GLS estimations. * = coefficient significant at p < 0.05.17
Figure 1.  Cesarean Rates and Fees in the HCUP Data, 1988-1992.
Note:  Unadjusted cesarean rates are in percentage points.  Adjusted cesarean rates are logit
coefficients on a full set of state*year dummies, in arbitrary units, in a logit also including all other
control variables included in Model (1) described in the text.  True adjusted cesarean rates would
be approximately linearly related to these coefficients.  The X-axis indexes years within states
(labeled by their postal code).18
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1. This estimator is a slight generalization of a common two-step procedure for dealing with the
clustering problem.  The generalization is that estimation of equation (3) accounts not just for
s,t sampling error in estimating m  in equation (2), but also for the covariance in these estimates across
time within states (both of which are taken from the covariance matrix estimated in equation (2)).
In practice, estimation is simplified by sweeping out state fixed effects in equation (2) before
estimating equation (3).  Further details are available from the author.
2. This measure is the simple ratio of the “Medicaid fee difference” in GKM’s Table 1b (some of
whose elements have been confirmed in the original data sources) and the “private payers’ average
charge” for vaginal delivery.  The latter is presented for 1989 in Exhibit 3 of Schwartz, Colby, and
Reisinger (1991), and is deflated or inflated for other years by GKM using data on hospital cost
inflation.  For 1989, then, this variable can be directly re-calculated, and the values compared to
those reported in Table 1c of the original paper. The results are below.
CA CO FL IA IL NJ PA WA WI
Table 1c 0.03 0.12 0 0.33 0.06 0.04 0.11 0.03 0.19
Our Recalculation 0.06 0.25 0 0.36 0.08 0.07 0.17 0.07 0.32
Endnotes